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Theoretical Problems of Public 
Interest Sector Industrial Relations 
Paul Phillips 
This paper develops a simple industry bargaing model 
with explicit considération of the déterminants of the bargain-
ing range and the narrowing of that range over time as a 
function of perceived bargaining power and costs of seule-
ment. The model is then applied to the public-interest 
sector under altered assumptions of costs of seulement 
and the introduction of political influences in the déter-
mination of bargaining paths. The impact of third party 
intervention is considered in both the industry and public-
interest sector cases. 
The purpose of this paper is to develop a simple bargaining model 
as it might apply to the normal industry case. In the model it will 
be possible to amplify on the rôle of conciliation, the strike/lockout, 
compulsory arbitration, expectations, strike insurance, union strike 
benefits, and so on, as they influence the procédures and outcome 
of collective bargaining. 
The second part of this paper will then attempt to see to what 
extent our 'industry' model fits the 'public-interest sector'. Let us first 
be clear as to what we mean by the public-interest sector. It is intend-
ed to include those industries which provide direct public services where 
the gênerai public has an intimate and direct interest in the outcome of 
a dispute. This could include, for example, private transit companies 
or private utilities. It is largely coterminous with the public sector but 
with important exceptions. For example, the Manitoba government 
owns a cruise boat on Lake Winnipeg. While the crown corporation 
that runs it is within the public sector, it can not really be considered 
to be within the public-interest 
classification. On the other hand, 
Bell Téléphone in Ontario, being 
privately owned, is not in the public 
* The author is indebted to the Manitoba Labour Management Review 
Committee and the Manitoba Department of Labour for their support of the research 
project out of which this paper developed, and also to Professor H. D. WOODS and 
Mr. Cam SHEPHERD for their helpful comments on the original draft. 
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sector but since it is an important utility it is considered to be in the 
public-interest sector (explicitly, since it is a regulated company). In 
other words, the public-interest sector is defined by being imbued with 
spécial public interest (the third party to any action), not by the nature 
of the ownership of the corporation, branch, service organization, etc. 
Elaboration of a bargaining model for the private industry sector 
will suggest reasons why it may not fit the public sector, and in turn, 
this will suggest reasons for the breakdown of industrial relations in the 
latter sector. This may well lead to the considération of possible alter-
native mechanisms for the settlement of industrial disputes in the public-
interest sector. 
THE SIMPLE BARGAINING MODEL 
Most bargaining models are concerned with the relative power of 
the two bargaining units in the strike/lockout situation. * The relative 
degrees of power are influenced by the costs of a dispute which, in turn 
are a function of many other variables such as the cost to employers 
of a shutdown, the amount of inventories, contractual agreements, the 
possibilities of employing other workers, etc. Similarly, for workers, the 
costs are determined by the state of the labour market, workers' 
contractual commitments (mortgages, monthly payments, etc.), their 
mobility, their strike fund, and so on.2 In almost every case, however, 
there is a range of settlement acceptability for both the employer and 
the union. 
The déterminants of employer and union minimums and maximums 
are generally simple. The employer minimum is most logically deter-
mined by the supply of labour. Should the employer offer a wage 
increase of less than some such minimum his workers would leave for 
1
 See J. T. MONTAGUE, Labour Markets in Canada, (Prentice Hall: Scar-
borough, 1970), pp. 213-228. 
2
 Strictly speaking, one should not necessarily equate 'union' with 'workers' 
since the goals, costs of disputes and commitments, etc., may not coincide exactly. For 
example, the union has a vested interest in maximizing membership and, therefore, em-
ployaient within its bargaining units ; while the individual worker has an obvious interest 
in maximizing his wages. Thèse two goals are very often in conflict. Ultimately, however, 
the union must rely ejther on the ratification by its members of a negotiated settlement 
or on the membership's support of a strike vote or actual strike and indeed the leader-
ship must attempt to maintain the support of the individual members if it wishes to main-
tain its political position. Therefore, under normal circumstances the union position must 
approximate the position of the majority of the individual workers. 
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other employment, thus producing a labour shortage. This may be 
extremely important in the case of maintaining skilled workers in a 
period of a tight labour market. The employer maximum is determined 
by the économies of the market — the maximum the firm could pay 
while it was still profitable to continue producing.3 
The union range is more difficult to specify. Both the desired 
level and the minimum acceptable level are influenced by the per-
ceptions of the union bargaining position (for instance, the company's 
'ability to pay') and comparisons with other industries, firms, and 
occupations, (the so called wage contour4). The upper and lower levels 
can also be influenced by internai union political situations. Never-
theless, we can say generally that the maximum demand represents 
a union préférence for some wage-employment combination that is 
considered economically feasible. The minimum can probably be use-
fully thought of as the lowest wage agreement that the union will accept 
without striking, alîhough the union may very well strike as a bargain-
ing tactic above this rate. The overlapping range, therefore, is the 
bargaining range. The actual settlement value will then be determined 
by the relative bargaining powers of employer and union. 
Before developing the argument further, we should consider the 
cases where the two ranges do not overlap. There are two such possible 
cases. It is obvious that if the union minimum exceeds the employer 
maximum no settlement is possible, at least without a strike or lockout 
— unless the union lowers its minimum, or the employer raises his 
maximum, or both. The threat of the strike/lockout or the strike/ 
lockout itself plays the rôle of inducing the two parties to adjust their 
respective minimums and maximums. If neither adjusts, either the 
employer goes out of business or the union effectively goes out of 
business as a resuit of the employer hiring non-union labour or members 
of a competing union. 
The case where the union maximum is less than the employer 
minimum may seem, at first glance, to be impossible, the union maxi-
mum being less than the minimum offered by the employer. Under 
spécial conditions such a situation can and has occurred resulting in 
wage drift — wages rising well above contracted rates. To give a 
3
 In conventional économie terms, this would coincide with the short run shut-
down point. 
4
 J. T. DUNLOP, «The Task of Contemporary Wage Theory», in The Theory 
of Wage Détermination, éd. by J. T. Dunlop. (Macmillan, New York: 1966.) pp. 3-27. 
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concrète example, in Sweden the union policy of «solidarity» called 
for the narrowing of inter-skill and inter-industry differentials. This 
meant that the unions wanted lower contractual rate increases for the 
already better paid workers. The employers, on the other hand, were 
faced with a tight labour market for skilled workers and therefore 
wanted to bid up the rates. In fact, what tended to happen was that 
although the contractual rate was agreed to at the union préférence 
level, the employers found it easy to évade the contract and pay more. 
Thus the wage levels 'drifted' up. For our purposes, however, this case 
is of little importance and will not be discussed. 
The model as developed up to this point only détermines the 
limits of bargaining. We hâve yet to discuss two other parameters, 
(a) the déterminants of bargaining power and (b) the procès s of bargain-
ing. 
Let us first consider the déterminants of bargaining power. As a 
gênerai rule, an employer's bargaining power will dépend on four 
factors : 
1. the cost to the employer of a work stoppage ; 
2. the ability of the employer to incur this cost; 
3. the ability of the employer to 'hurt' the union or its membership 
through incurring a work stoppage ; 
4. the employers détermination not to concède to the union (often 
referred to as the employer's 'will to resist'). 
On the union side there is a parallel set of déterminants : 
1. the cost to the worker (and indirectly, the union) of a work stop-
page ; 
2. the ability of the worker/union to incur this cost; 
3. the ability of the union to 'hurt' the employer through pursuing 
a work stoppage ; 
4. the union's détermination not to concède to the employer's demands 
(the union's 'will to resist'). 
The bargaining strategy of the two sides is greatly influenced by 
their respective perceptions of their relative bargaining powers. Thus, 
an employer with adéquate reserves, a large inventory, facing a finan-
cially or organizationally weak union, and determined to give the 
union a lesson would tend to be intransigent. Similarly, a union of 
skilled workers in a period of relatively full employment, with a well-
stocked strike fund, facing an oligopolistic employer which can pass 
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increased labour costs on, able to completely shut down the employer 
and organize secondary boycotts, and determined to brandish 'the 
strength of our right a rm\ will be equally intransigent. Ail bargaining 
strategy, on both sides, therefore, must be analysed in terms of the 
perceptions of each as to their own and the opposition's bargaining 
power. We say 'perceptions' because it is not necessarily true that the 
real bargaining power of the employer or union is the same as the two 
parties believe it to be. The outcome of any dispute, however, will 
normally reflect the real bargaining power of the two parties. 
We can suggest that, assuming both parties are rational, they 
will each approach a negotiation from a cost-benefit point of view. 
Any possible solution will be approached by comparing the perceived 
cost of settling with the perceived costs of rejecting the settlement. 
This can be illustrated by a model (somewhat similar to the avoidance 
— avoidance model of C. Stevens5) illustrated in figure 1. The em-
ployer (or union) acceptance curve is in some ways comparable to a 
utility curve in consumer theory. The closer the settlement to the 
employer's most desired position (A) the greater will be his satisfaction. 
At A, the employer may be considered at his perfectly satisfied (or 
100 percent satisfied) position. As the wage increase he is forced to 
accept rises, his satisfaction with the outcome diminishes to position 
(B) where he has zéro satisfaction and therefore could not accept any 
settlement. The union acceptance curve, similarly, represents the degree 
of satisfaction within a range of wage increase settlements. In other 
words as potential settlements increase from C to D, the acceptability 
of such settlements to the union rises. 
What mechanism, within the model, induces union and employer 
to settle at S? Let us assume that the latest company offer is at O. The 
union perceives that the acceptability of such an agreement to the 
employer is higher than it is to its membership. The will to resist is 
thereby strengthened. It is only where the union perceives that the 
employer is equally satisfied (or equally dissatisfied) with the resuit 
that it is willing to concède. 
The actual position of thèse acceptance curves will dépend on 
the cost-benefit calculus of agreeing or disagreeing to any particular 
settlement. (Note that we are only considering wage demands whereas 
the issues involved in any dispute will normally involve a list of other 
issues. Alternatively, we might suggest that it is possible to convert ail 
5
 C. STEVENS, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations. (McGraw-
Hill: New York, 1963). 
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FIGURE 1 
Acceptance-Acceptance Equilibrium Bargaining Model 
^ J 100 
Index of 
Employer 
Acceptance 
-ces: 
Employer S^^m., , , 
Kange 
Wage Incroi 
Index 
of 
Union 
Acceptance 
A - Employer 
Minimum 
B - Employer 
Maximum 
C - Union Minimum 
D - Union Maximum 
S - Position of 
Final 
Settlement 
demands into 'real wage' values and talk about the total value of the 
package and the total cost of the package. This may be quite realistic 
in the context of normal bargaining where «package» settlements are 
the rule6 while begging the question of those thorny issues which are 
impossible to convert into value terms, such as the extent of manage-
ment rights.) As we hâve stressed, the degree to which either party 
accepts a settlement figure, (that is the actual position and shape of 
the acceptance curves) will be determined by the perceived bargaining 
power of the parties to the dispute. 
The above formulation of bargaining theory, stressing perceptions 
of bargaining power implies a somewhat static, mechanistic approach 
and some sort of equilibrium solution which, if we could only develop 
methods of finding it, would solve ail industrial conflict. As anybody 
who has been involved knows, however, nothing could be farther from 
the truth. The essence of bargaining strategy and the rationale for the 
provision of 3rd party (government) intervention is changing the per-
ceptions as the bargaining process takes place such that acceptance 
by both parties will take place before a work stoppage or, failing that, 
as soon as possible after a stoppage begins. In other words, what is 
6
 « The outeome of collective bargaining negotiation is by agreement. Character-
istically, such agreement must be upon ail the items comprising the agenda ... The items 
comprising a package are to a considérable extent commensurable in terms of cost, and, 
to a considérable extent, it is the total cost of the package that matters. In conséquence, 
agreement on ail the items is what matters. » Ibid., p . 44. 
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important is the changing willingness to concède to an offer/demand 
under pressure from a strike/lockout or the threat of a work stoppage. 
Let us first discuss the typical bargaining stratégies in the industrial 
sector. Under contemporary économie conditions, (rising wages), the 
union initiâtes bargaining, usually at some specified time before the 
existing contract expires. The initial demand the union makes is almost 
invariably higher than the union might reasonably expect to settle for. 
In answer the employer makes an offer, normally the minimum it could 
expect to offer and still retain its labour force, and below that which it 
expects it will finally settle for.7 Thèse two initial positions need not 
be exactly the same as the union's 'maximum' demand or the em-
ployées 'minimum' offer as defined in figure 1, but for our purposes 
we can take thèse two positions as the relevant starting points. 
From thèse initial points, both parties make concessions, limited 
of course by the market and power influences enumerated above. The 
reason concessions are made is because of the wish to avoid the cost 
of a work stoppage. If this threat is not sufficient to bring about a 
seulement then the strike/lockout will take place and the two parties 
will be forced to bear the costs. Because of thèse additional costs, and 
the package nature of bargaining both parties may initially revert to 
earlier, less conciliatory, positions, temporarily until the économie 
pressures force compromises. Although the existence of any real 
«hardening» or désire to punish the opposition by reverting to earlier 
demands is perhaps unlikely, the nature of package bargaining tends to 
give the same effect. For instance, the union's initial demand may hâve 
included 2 extra statutory holidays plus a ten percent wage increase. 
It might hâve agreed in subséquent bargaining to one extra day providing 
a satisfactory wage increase was negotiated. Failure to achieve the 
latter, thus precipitating a strike, means that the concession on holidays 
is automatically rescinded. Almost inevitably, however, the concession 
will be restored in subséquent negotiations. While it is natural that both 
parties will attempt to devise means to limit the costs of a stoppage, 
to the extent that they can, they are likely to prolong the dispute and, 
indeed, to increase the incidence of work stoppage in the first place. 
Strike/lockouts, of course, could be almost completely eliminated or at 
7
 There is one major exception to this pattern, often referred to as «Boulwa-
rism», which means the employées initial offer is deemed (by itself) «reasonable» and 
indeed is its final offer. It is questionable under such a System, whether the term «bar-
gaining» is therefore, appropriate. STEVENS refers to the high initial demand and low 
initial offer as the «Large initial bargaining demand rule». Ibid., pp. 32-34. 
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least greatly reduced in duration merely by weakening one party so that 
it has no power to resist. Indeed, Adam Smith was cognizant of this 
when he wrote8 in 1776 his famous Inquiry into the Nature and Causes 
of the Wealth of Nations. 
The central feature of Canadien labour législation in the 20th 
Century has been the devising of mechanisms by which two goals 
could be reached: (a) limiting the occurrence and duration of work 
stoppages (compulsory third party intervention); and (b) increasing 
the bargaining power of employée organizations to bring more equity 
to the respective bargaining powers (compulsory récognition, the 
checkoff, etc.) 
It should immediately be recognized that thèse goals conflict. We 
might also note that the emphasis in this tradeoff has shifted from the 
first of thèse goals (work stoppage avoidance) in the early years of 
this century to the second, equilizing bargaining power or the equity 
question, most noticeably with and since the passage of P.C. 1003 
in 1944. Since the 1960's the major extension of collective bargaining 
to the public sector is a reflection of this trend. 
Within this framework we would like to formalize our bargaining 
model. This can be shown for the employer in figure 2 and for the 
union in figure 3. Let it be made clear that the actual position and 
slope of each 'concession curve' will vary with each individual case but 
the pattern is likely to remain similar. The concession curve indicates 
the settlements acceptable to the union (employer) at différent times in 
the bargaining period. 
8
 « What are the common wages of labour, dépends everywhere upon the 
contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests are by no means the 
same. The workmen désire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible. The 
former are disposed to combine in order to raise, the latter in order to lower the wages of 
labour. It is not, however, difficult to foresee which of the two parties must, upon ail ordi-
nary occasions, hâve the advantage in the dispute, and force the other into a compliance 
with their terms. The masters, being fewer in number, can combine much more easily ; and 
the law, besides, authorises, or at least does not prohibit their combinations, while it 
prohibits those of the workmen ... In ail such disputes the masters can hold out much 
longer. A landlord, a farmer, a master manufacturer, or merchant, though they did not 
employ a single workman, could generally live a year or two upon the stocks which they 
hâve already acquired. Many workmen could not subsist a week, few could subsist a 
month, and scarce any a year without employment. In the longrun the workman may be 
as necessary to his master as his master is to him, but the necessity is not so immédiate. » 
Adam SMITH, The Wealth of Nations, (Irwin: Homewood, Illinois, 1963), Vol. I, pp. 
53-54.) 
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FIGURE 2 
Diagrammatic Représentation of Employer's 
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FIGURE 3 
Diagrammatic Représentation of Union's 
Willingness to Concède to Employer's 
Wage Offer as a Function of Time 
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For most contracts, agreement will be reached before a strike/ 
lockout takes place. This can be shown as in figure 4. 
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FIGURE 4 
Diagrammatic Représentation of Bargaining 
Agreement Before Strike Deadline 
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In other cases, agreement may not be until the added cost of an 
actual shut-down enters into the union-employer cost benefit calculus. 
This is illustrated in figure 5. 
FIGURE 5 
Diagrammatic Représentation of Bargaining 
Agreement After Strike Deadline 
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Other examples, where no solution is achievable can be illustrat-
ed but are of little importance to us hère. 
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This particular model is useful, quite apart from its explanatory 
use, in analyzing the policies relating to third-party intervention. 
Consider the effects of conciliation, médiation or the appointment of 
an enquiry commission, either before or after a strike/lockout. In terms 
of our model, the purpose of this type of intervention is to change the 
perceptions of the respective sides as to the concession paths of their 
opponents and to moderate the concession paths so that a seulement 
is possible. By acting as a good faith intermediary, threatening a con-
trary report, cajoling, exchanging information, or suggesting a seule-
ment that conceivably would resuit from a strike but without resort 
to a strike, third party intervention is aimed at bringing the parties to-
gether sooner. Two possibilities exist, where through intermediation9 
the concession curves are altered to prevent a strike/lockout, and 
second where intermediation reduces the duration of the dispute. 
The first case lowers the union concession curve and/or raises the 
employer concession curve such that they intersect prior to the strike 
deadline. The second case modifies the concession curves in the some 
manner after the strike deadline, producing an earlier seulement. 
Finally, we can use our model to illustrate the effect of com-
pulsory arbitration. Two possible cases exist. The first, and simplest, 
is where compulsory arbitration is imposed without prior warning, 
after a work stoppage is underway. This is a somewhat unusual type 
of case and is likely to be effective only very occasionally. Oft or 
repeated use will resuit in the parties assuming that compulsory arbi-
tration will be imposed and hence adjust their bargaining stratégies 
appropriately. The différence in stratégies can be illustrated by figure 
6. In the first case (illustrated by the solid Unes U' and E') bargaining 
is not affected, up until the arbitration board is appointée. At that 
point, positions are frozen until the issues are compulsorily adjudicated. 
Such a model only prevails if neither side has any prémonition of the 
imposition of arbitration. 
The more usual case exists where arbitration may be provided 
by law or by previous agreement. Under such circumstances, the 
prédiction of behaviour becomes more hazardous. Nevertheless, we 
may suggest a typical response. Knowing that arbitration will be im-
posed, neither party may be willing to modify its demands, believing 
that, to do so, would negatively affect its position before the arbi-
trator(s). Both parties may, of course, modify their initial demands hop-
9
 The term «intermediation» as used in this paper means any form of third-
party intervention short of arbitration. 
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FIGURE 6 
Diagrammatic Représentation of Compulsory Arbitration 
After Strike Deadline and Without the Right of Strike 
or Walkout 
Change in 
Contract r 
Wages 
1 
Arbitration Settlement 
Imposed Imposed Time 
ing to make their cause seem more reasonable but arbitration is likely 
to inhibit any compromise before compulsory settlement machinery 
is imposed (coinciding with the strike deadline in the normal case), on 
the not unreasonable grounds that arbiters tend to 'split the différence'. 
Thus, our model will look like the dotted lines U" and E" in figure 6. 
There is, of course, no reason why the imposed settlement need 
bear any resemblance to what would hâve been determined by the 
free use of market and power forces. The more that the imposed set-
telment varies from what one or other of the parties believes would 
hâve been the resuit under free collective bargaining, the greater the 
threat to industrial relations for the duration of the agreement. This 
will tend to be true whether or not the arbitration award approximates 
what would hâve been the settlement or not. It is what is believed 
that détermines attitudes. 
Up to this point we hâve been outlining a bargaining model based 
on the Aicw-public interest sector, or as we hâve termed it, the indus-
trial sector model. We must now attempt to apply this to the public-
interest sector to identify if, and in what ways, this model may apply 
to this sector. 
BARGAINING IN THE PUBLIC-INTEREST SECTOR 
We have talked so far as if the public-interest sector is mono-
lithic — that is, one with universal characteristics. As we perceive it, 
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however, there are several fairly distinct catégories. It may be useful 
at this point to identify three such groupings. 
A. «Emergency» Classification 
— fire and police 
— hospital employées 
B. Utility Classification 
— hydro, téléphone, and gas workers and similar type utili-
ties10 
— municipal employées in water works, garbage collection 
— public transportation employées 
C. « Non-emergency » Public Employée Classification 
— Civil servants and municipal employées not already specified 
— teachers (school, university, community collèges) 
— other crown corporations' and agencies' employées 
It is useful to specify thèse classifications, because the political 
and économie environment is sufficiently différent in terms of our 
model specified above. Let us deal with thèse in turn. 
The emergency classification is quite distinct in a market sensé 
from the pressures implicit in the industrial model. On the side of the 
employer there is no 'économie' upper limit (excepting the ultimate 
ability to tax) ; there is no market test of ability to pay, no marketed 
product and no 'compétition' within the market. The détermination 
of the employer's concession curve, therefore, tends to be determined 
primarily by political forces. On the union side the market may be more 
comparable to the industry sector, although a comparison of wages and 
working conditions in many occupations is difficult since the private 
sector often has no comparable occupation group. What is, of course, 
obvious is that the ultimate pressure on both sides is the threat of 
irréparable loss to third parties (the public) due to a work stoppage. 
This is the ultimate déterrent to both employer and union. It is not, 
however, obvious upon which side this threat has the most immediacy. 
If we were to speculate on the shape of the concession curves, 
we would suggest that the threat of irréparable loss would place extrême 
pressures on both parties to compromise without a strike/lockout and, 
10
 Automobile insurance, when it is provided by a public monopoly (such as 
Autopac in Manitoba) or by a consortium of private companies bargaining as a single unit 
would constitute a «utilities» case, Similarly, we might include liquor board employées 
in the province. 
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indeed, this seems to hâve been the case where compulsory arbitration 
has not been resorted to. n It is in the very small number of cases 
where pressures of one or both sides prevent a seulement that the 
issue arises. It is expected that the enormous real or potential loss to 
the public, and the conséquent 'blacklash' of public opinion would 
induce a rapid seulement. This, however, is where the unequal recourse 
to political tools causes difficulty for it is quite likely (and probably 
usual) for the government to then change the rules of the game and 
resort to législative imposition of compulsory arbitration. What will 
happen in subséquent negotiations, then, becomes impossible to predict. 
The utility classification, of the three groups in the public-interest 
sector, is the most comparable with our industry model. However, there 
are distinct and important différences. The employers tend to be reg-
ulated monopolies (which influences their ability to pay although not 
as determined by the market) and which are usually involved in es-
sential services which hâve a similar, if not quite as immédiate, po-
tential for third party loss as does the emergency classification. In 
other words, they represent marketable commodities or services, 
albeit of an essential type, of monopolies that are able, within limits, 
to détermine the market price. (In technical terms, this means that 
the demand schedules are highly inelastic, almost perfectly inelastic 
within the relevant range.) The upper limit for the employer, there-
fore, again within reasonable limits, tends to be very flexible. On the 
union side, comparability with other industries may be more realistic 
than in any of the other public-interest sector cases, but again, the 
main inducement to seule on both sides of a dispute is the political 
pressure from the public which directly or indirectly bears the cost 
and disutility of the interruption of services that results from a strike/ 
lockout. 
The category that includes the non-emergency, non-utility workers 
is the most difficult to deal with. In gênerai, with the exception of 
crown corporations in commercial industries, they are employed by a 
public authority out of tax monies. Therefore, the employer (the gov-
ernment) has no 'break even' or 'shut down' point in any économie 
sensé. The upper limit is purely political (except in the sensé of an 
ultimate limit of taxation). There is no market test for the services 
provided. There are no compétitive employers; indeed, there is un-
likely to be any comparable private sector employer. 
11
 Note, for instance, the long standing prohibition in the fire-fighters union 
constitution against striking by member locals. 
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Since the function of the strike/lockout is to put économie 
pressure on the employer and the union to settle, our model tends 
to break down because in many cases, a work stoppage, in the short 
run, saves the employer (the government) money. Indeed, the économie 
loss may never be noticeable or measurable for any individual or group. 
The only immédiate and apparent cost that may arise, therefore, is a 
political one. The costs, if they do appear at ail, tend to be at the ex-
pense of the gênerai public and widely diffused. The costs may be 
obvious (as in the case of teachers, although this might be more per-
ceived then actual except in the case of working parents who rely 
on the school System as a day care agency) or they may be hidden. 
How many people would expérience a recognizeable loss or even mild 
inconvenience if the employées of the provincial ombudsman's office 
or the city planning office were absent for a month or two? In fact, 
the absence of thèse types of employées might even redound to the 
advantage of the government concerned since expenditures would 
fall without a corresponding décline in revenues, thus permitting a 
réduction in required taxation. 
At the same time, a dispute with the union in this categoiry might 
give the governing agency the opportunity of implementing a macro-
economic policy. For instance, should the government wish to im-
plement a restrictive wage policy, it might attempt to do so by restrict-
ing the public employées to some preconceived upper limit regard-
less of the conséquences of a strike/lockout. Using the public employée 
serves two goals for the government, restricting the économie cost of 
a settlement and demonstrating a government policy. The union, 
however, does not hâve comparable options. The cost to the workers 
does not vary significantly from that in the private sector. 
In summary then, the employer costs which induce the employer 
to settle in our model, vary in the public-interest sector from extrême 
third party loss and conséquent political pressure in the case of emer-
gency category stoppages (and, to a lesser extent possibly, utility 
stoppages) to minimal, non-visible and possibly even négative économie 
costs, at least in the short run for the non-emergency category.12 The 
basic characteristic, however, of ail thèse catégories is that there is 
limited direct économie pressure on the employer to settle but rather, 
there is political pressure from the public which bears the cost in one 
form or another. 
12
 Not ail public employée groups hâve no direct effect on government revenues. 
Consider employées selling, and enforcing, fishing licences as an example. 
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As a broad, possibly sweeping, generalization, we suggest that the 
économie pressures of the industrial sector are replaced by political 
pressures in the public-interest sector. This présents severe strains 
on the bargaining relationship. Consider the case where a government 
has issued a budget authorizing a certain level of taxes and expendi-
tures, or an even more direct case where the budget contains wage-
price guidelines. A union demand for wage increases in excess of the 
expenditure limits or of the guidelines is often seen, then, as a direct 
challenge to the political authority of the government, (or the so-called 
sovereignty argument). This then tends to lead to the interprétation of 
the dispute, at least by the government concerned, as being between 
'démocratie government' and 'government by the unions'. Indeed, if 
the bargaining group is large, the union's demands may actually threaten 
the government's économie or fiscal policy.13 
We might also point out another significant différence between 
public-interest sector disputes and those in the industrial sector. If 
the government intervenes as a third party in an industrial dispute, 
it can do so on the grounds of the damage to third parties and yet 
still maintain some degree of credibility since it is not party to the 
dispute. However, if the government were to intervene in a dispute 
to which it was an interested party, it lacks credibility to suggest that 
it is doing so as a disinterested body. 
By way of gênerai summary, then, we must conclude that the 
prime détermination of the employer's concession curve is political. 
Yet the very rejection by the union of that concession curve (which is 
the same as non-acceptance at each and every point) appears to many 
to constitute a rejection of elected authority. We might postulate the 
following situation (see figure 7) where the dispute may be significantly 
drawn out by the unwillingness of the government to compromise 
on its fiscal or wage policy. Alternatively, we may suggest the case 
of an emergency industry (say a police force) where the costs of a 
strike are exceptionally high (both in real terms to the gênerai public 
and in political terms to the government) which might be illustrated as 
in figure 8. 
13
 Certainly, the demands of the united front of Québec unions were interpreted 
by the Québec government as a direct threat to its économie solvency. Another example 
is the récent British Coalminer's strike which the British Government interpreted as a 
challenge to its anti-inflation program. It is significant that the subséquent gênerai élection 
that was precipatated by the impasse was fought by the governing party on the issue 
(or slogan) of «who governs Britain» implying a conflict between the miners' collective 
bargaining demands and the elected government's législative powers. 
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In either of thèse cases, the government body may not be will-
ing either to accept the duration of the dispute (figure 7) or the cost 
of the settlement (figure 8) and will thus use its législative power to 
intervene by way of compulsory arbitration or some such limitation 
on the right to strike. This then reduces the model to the one pictured 
previously (figure 6) and is subject to the same limitations. Indeed the 
limitations may even be more serious because, in the industry sector 
there is much greater likelihood that an arbitrator will hâve some com-
parable occupation, industry or employer by which to judge the 'équi-
table' wage level or working condition.14 
CONCLUSION 
There is nothing in this formulation of bargaining theory that 
suggests any simple answers to the questions raised by public-interest 
sector bargaining. In fact, the purpose of the model is primarily to 
systematize our conception of the bargaining process and make clear 
the rôle of the strike/lockout in this process; and secondly, to indicate 
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14
 The model, of course, does not indicate ail of the problems implicit in com-
pulsory arbitration such as the inhérent tendency to limit the scope of arbitrable issues, 
lack of flexibility, unwillingness of one or both parties to police an imposed agreement, 
or the spécial problem in the public-interest sector of placing the government's fiscal/ 
économie policy in the hands of an independent person or board without setting limits 
which destroy the independence of the arbiter. 
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the major différences between industry bargaining and public-interest 
sector bargaining. This is not to say that the concession curves of ail 
industries or firms in the private sector will approximate the same 
paths any more than we hâve suggested that they are the same in the 
public-interest sector. Indeed, the most perceptible différence is that 
the pressures to compromise in the public interest sector reflect to a 
greater extent political costs than in the industry sector where économie 
pressures are paramount. We may also conclude that even this dif-
férence is only one of degree since any dispute in a major industry 
brings political pressures to bear because of the injury to third parties,15 
and that in many public interest disputes, économie pressures may be 
paramount to the public authority.16 However, it is intended that this 
model may provide a useful framework within which to consider the 
problems and alternatives in public interest sector contract détermination. 
What are some of the alternatives in public interest disputes? 
Inevitably the question reverts to the more fundamental one, what 
are the alternatives to the strike? Almost immediately, compulsory 
arbitration is suggested. But as expérience and our model indicate, 
compulsory arbitration is beset with problems. It must be emphasized 
that the rôle of the strike/lockout in collective bargaining is to create 
a costly alternative to both parties to not arriving at a negotiated set-
FIGURE 8 
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15
 Consider, for example, the strike/lockout of elevator constructors in 1973 
and the resulting pressure upon governments to enforce settlement because of the costs 
incurred by building owners, apartment dwellers and office workers, etc. 
16
 Consider the case where billing clerks and meter readers of a utility strike, 
thus cutting of the flow of income to a utility company ; or where bus drivers strike cut-
ting off transit income. 
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tlement. There can be little doubt that mandatory arbitration does not, 
in most cases, impose such costs and, in fact, may provide a cheap 
«out» for one or both parties, particularly since governments hâve 
shown ^penchant for directly or indirectly, intervening in, or circumvent-
ing arbitration where it fears the results will be costly to them. 
Various alternatives hâve been suggested. Thèse may be clas-
sified as (a) modified strike rights (the partial and statutory strike), 
(b) modified compulsory arbitration (final offer sélection arbitration) 
and (c) the «arsenal of weapons». The first alternative involves some 
limitation on the strike/lockout weapon so that costs accrue to both 
parties directly involved but the effect upon the gênerai public is made 
bearable. Rotating strikes fit into this category as does the fédéral pro-
vision for the désignation of essential personnel who may not strike. 
In some areas this may be a feasible alternative providing that the 
partial strike effectively costs the public authority, in which case it 
approximates the standard industry model. It is, however, difficult to 
think of many cases where the situation might apply.17 
Modified compulsory arbitration is virtually restricted to the 
one case of « final offer sélection ». In such a case the arbiter is restrict-
ed to choosing between the final demand of the union and the final 
offer of the employer, whichever he thinks is the more reasonable. In 
terms of our model, the basic argument is that the «ail or nothing» 
nature of the décision will induce both to bargain seriously because the 
uncertainty and possible conséquences of the final outcome, 
should either side not compromise, is so great as to preclude the rigid 
behaviour suggested above. In other words, the strategy of refusing to 
compromise in the expectation that the arbiter will «split the différ-
ence» is no longer possible. «Either-or» arbitration, as it might be 
characterized, has its definite attractions in encouraging negotiation. 
This is illustrated in figure 9. However, ail of the other arguments 
against compulsory arbitration are undiminished. In fact, the charge of 
partisanship on the part of the arbiter is almost inévitable. Also, one 
might be skeptical as to whether a government would accept the pro-
cédure on a continuing basis should the arbiter accept in whole or in 
part the union's last demand. As an ad hoc arrangement in certain 
circumstances, it might be a successful procédure; as a continuing 
system, it is unlikely to be a permanent solution. 
17
 One suggestion might be the post office where the union agrées to handle ail 
non-stamped mail. Presumably, the government would refuse to pay the postal employées 
resulting in économie loss to both sides. It is doubtful if the public would object, although 
this might lessen the government's désire to settle. 
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The idea of an «arsenal of weapons», while not new, has received 
récent reconsideration in Canada in relation to the public sector.18 
Under such a proposai, the industrial relations authority would hâve 
at its discrétion a number of remédies in the case of impasse in a dis-
pute in a sensitive area. Among the arsenal might be included fact-
finding boards, industrial enquiry commissions, spécial mediators, 
trustée opération of the industry and union, voluntary arbitration and 
even compulsory arbitration. The operative principle is that neither 
party should know what form of intervention will take place and cannot, 
thereby, adapt to any particular form of intervention. In theory, the 
uncertainty of procédure and outcome should induce both sides to 
bargain more seriously rather than risk the caprice of the intervenor. 
In terms of the model, the effect should be to induce the parties to 
modify their respective concession curves prior to impasse or, should 
an impasse occur, to seriously reconsider their positions in the hopes 
of avoiding potential unfavourable results from the unknown intervention 
as discussed above. The success of the use of the arsenal dépends 
upon the fear or the parties due to the uncertainty. For this reason, 
there appears more likelihood of success in municipal disputes where 
the government body concerned is not the sovereign authority in labour 
relations than at the provincial or fédéral level where one of the in-
terested parties has an executive involvement. 
18
 See for instance, John CRISPO, «Collective Bargaining in the Public Service », 
paper given to the 24th Annual Conférence of the Institute of Public Administration of 
Canada, Fredericton, Sept. 7, 1972. 
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Up to this point, in both the industry and public-interest sector 
models, we hâve concerned ourselves only with seulement procédures 
which are provided (or imposed) by législation or by ad hoc interven-
tion on the part of government or its agencies. One question that arises 
is, are the models affected if the parties voluntarily accept a seulement 
procédure which differs from, but does not conflict with, the normal 
procédure. Such arrangements could include anything from voluntary 
binding arbitration to forms of contractual « strike/lockout » such as 
an agreement to pay wages and company profits into a charitable fund 
without a work shutdown from the strike deadline until a new agreement 
is reached. 
It should be noted that thèse voluntary procédures do not differ 
in principle from the more normal ones in our standard models. Vol-
untary binding arbitration is merely a substitution of self-imposed 
for government-imposed compulsion. In the case of contractual strikes, 
the costs to the two sides are voluntarily accepted but without any 
interruption in service or production, thereby eliminating third party 
injury. 
While not différent in principle, however, voluntary procédures 
may be very différent in practice, first because the voluntary procé-
dures may be tailored to the spécifie nature or problems of a partic-
ular group or industry, and second, because the existence of voluntary 
agreements of this type almost invariably attest to a willingness by 
the two parties to work together and prevent work stoppages, a willing-
ness that augurs well for subséquent contract negotiations. In terms 
of our models, the effect would probably be to narrow more quickly 
the gap between union and employer which in itself would tend to pro-
duce quicker settlements and fewer work stoppages. In theoretical 
terms, the effect of voluntary arrangements would be to alter the per-
ceptions that the two parties hâve of one another thereby shifting the 
concession curves closer together. Therefore, in terms of our diagram-
matic models, the curves may be shifted, but the patterns of behaviour 
as indicated by the courses of the concession curves should not other-
wise be affected. 
What is clear is that the success of collective bargaining in the 
public-interest sector is dépendent on the good faith of both sides — 
that the union will not use the political vulnerability of the govern-
mental authority to extract exorbitant terms, and conversely, that the 
public agency will not use its législative and executive powers to subvert 
or influence legitimate collective bargaining. Since good faith can not 
be legislated, the problem remains. 
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La question théorique de l'intérêt public en 
matière de relations de travail 
Le but de l'article précédent est la mise au point d'un modèle très simple de 
négociations collectives tel qu'on le retrouve dans un cas d'entreprise ordinaire. Par ce 
modèle, il est possible de faire ressortir le rôle de la conciliation, de la grève ou du 
lock out, de l'arbitrage obligatoire, de l'assurance-grève, des indemnités de grève et des 
espoirs des parties tels qu'ils influencent le processus et le dénouement de la négociation 
collective. 
Ce modèle de négociation diffère de beaucoup d'autres en ce qu'il introduit les 
dimensions temps et coût en tant que facteurs importants qui amènent les parties à 
s'entendre ou non. Ce modèle reconnaît l'existence d'un éventail chevauchant de solu-
tions possibles à l'intérieur desquels se dessine une solution finale réalisable et il énonce 
succinctement les limites du pouvoir de marchandage à l'intérieur de cet éventail. De 
même, il y est discuté du rôle d'une tierce partie eu égard à son influence sur le com-
portement des parties à la table des négociations et sur le risque et la durée d'un arrêt 
de travail. 
La deuxième partie de l'article analyse dans quelle mesure ce modèle emprunté 
à l'entreprise privée peut s'appliquer aux différends dans le secteur d'intérêt public, 
c'est-à-dire dans les entreprises qui fournissent des services dans lesquels le public en 
général a un intérêt direct et immédiat au dénouement du différend, le secteur public 
étant ici défini en tant qu'intérêt public et non pas en tant que propriétaire de l'entre-
prise. 
Le modèle de négociation de type industriel apparaît d'une certaine manière 
inapproprié au secteur d'intérêt public parce que les facteurs temps et coût qui poussent 
les deux parties à s'engager sur la voie des concessions dans l'entreprise privée sont 
faussés dans le secteur d'intérêt public. Les employeurs et les syndicats sont néces-
sairement obligés de considérer les conséquences politiques qui peuvent affecter leurs 
positions respectives et la perception qu'ils ont du pouvoir de négociation de l'autre 
partie. 
Finalement, l'auteur traite de certaines suggestions qui pourraient s'appliquer 
à l'occasion de l'intervention d'un tiers dans les différends touchant le secteur d'intérêt 
public et il conclut son étude en soutenant que le succès de la négociation collective 
dans ce secteur repose sur la bonne foi des parties, le syndicat ne cherchant pas à uti-
liser la vulnérabilité politique de l'autorité publique pour obtenir des gains exagérés 
et la société d'État ne cherchant pas de son côté à se servir de son pouvoir législatif 
ou exécutif pour faire échouer la négociation collective. 
